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without the benefit of Miranda, in the emergency room of a
hospital prior to and during his treatment for two gunshot
wounds, which left him paralyzed and blind.  The Fifth
Amendment, made applicable to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires that “no person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  The court
concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation
because there was no “criminal case” to trigger the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee against self-incrimination.  Thomas
writes that a “criminal case . . . requires the initiation of legal
proceedings;” the Fifth Amendment protection is a “trial right.”
The Court, however, remands the case to determine whether or
not petitioner has unsuccessfully stated a claim for violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.  
FIFTH AMENDMENT: INVOLUNTARY DRUG
ADMINISTRATION TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
In Sell v. United States,4 a 6-3 Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Breyer, held that the involuntary administration of drugs
to an individual accused of a crime to make him competent to
stand trial does not violate that individual’s Fifth Amendment
“liberty” rights provided that it is necessary to achieve impor-
tant governmental trial-related interests.  The Court looked to
two prior cases to reach this conclusion, Washington v. Harper,5
and Riggins v. Nevada.6 In Harper, the Court held that “the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who
has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his
will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  While the Court
recognized “that an individual has a ‘significant’ constitutionally
protected ‘liberty interest’ in ‘avoiding the unwanted adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs,’” the Court determined that the
state’s interest was “legitimate” and “important” allowing such
treatment when the inmate poses a threat to himself or others.
In Riggins, the Court “repeated that an individual has a consti-
tutionally protected liberty ‘interest in avoiding involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs’—an interest that only an
‘essential’ or ‘overriding’ state interest might overcome.”  It also
“suggested that, in principle, forced medication in order to ren-
der a defendant competent to stand trial for murder was consti-
tutionally permissible.”  
In criminal cases, this term of the United States SupremeCourt had several important decisions, but no landmarkcases.  The Court continued to favor law enforcement.  One
significant development was the substantial impact of section
2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is
having in closing the door of federal courts to state prisoners
petitioning for the writ of habeas corpus.  Here are several of
the important criminal decisions decided this term.1
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ILLEGAL DETENTION AND
COERCED CONFESSIONS
The Court, per curiam, in Kaupp v. Texas,2 determined that a
suspect’s “detention” in the middle of the night by a cohort of
police officers without an arrest warrant or any probable cause
is sufficiently similar to an arrest to warrant suppression of his
confession under the Fourth Amendment.  The suspect was
awoken in the middle of the night by police officers, taken from
bed to the scene of the crime, and then taken to the sheriff’s
headquarters.  There, he was given his Miranda warnings and
questioned.  He eventually confessed to participating in the
crime. The detectives acted on a “pocket warrant;” they did not
seek a conventional arrest warrant because they did not believe
that they had sufficient evidence for probable cause.  The con-
fession was allowed into evidence at trial and the petitioner was
convicted.  Reversing and remanding the decision, the court
stated, “Although certain seizures may be justified on some-
thing less than probable cause, . . . [the Court has] never ‘sus-
tained against Fourth Amendment challenge the involuntary
removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his
detention there for investigative purposes . . . absent probable
cause or judicial authorization.”  
FIFTH AMENDMENT: POLICE INTERROGATION
Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court in
Chavez v. Martinez.3 Here, the court found that the petitioner
failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
for violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrim-
ination when he was coercively interrogated, but was never
prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case.  Petitioner was shot during
an altercation with two police officers and was questioned,
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The Court surmised that these two cases “indicate that the
Constitution permits the Government to involuntarily adminis-
ter antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing seri-
ous criminal charges in order to render that defendant compe-
tent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appro-
priate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less
intrusive alternative, is significantly necessary to further impor-
tant governmental trial-related interests.”  The Court enumer-
ated a four-part test.  First, there must be an “important gov-
ernmental interest” at stake.  Second, “the court must conclude
that involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests,” i.e., “administration of the drugs is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial.”  Third, “the court must conclude that involuntary med-
ication is necessary to further those interests,” that “alternative,
less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially
the same results.”  And last, “the court must conclude that
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the
patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”
FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Addressing the issue of double jeopardy, the Court, in
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,7 held double jeopardy was not a bar
when a defendant is sentenced to death at retrial after having
been sentenced to life at the initial trial pursuant to a state law
that mandates a life sentence when a jury is deadlocked on the
issue of sentencing.  In this case, after the guilt phase of the
trial, a trial for the penalty phase was held.  The jury could not
reach a decision and defendant moved under Pennsylvania law
that the jury be discharged and that the court enter a sentence
of life imprisonment.  The judge entered the required life sen-
tence.  Defendant then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which concluded that the trial judge had incorrectly
instructed the jury on several offenses, including the first-
degree murder charge.  The Superior Court reversed and
remanded the case.  On remand, Pennsylvania filed a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty.  In addition to the aggravating
circumstance alleged at the first sentencing, the notice also
alleged another aggravating circumstance—his newly acquired
felony record from his various guilty pleas at the first trial.
Defendant moved to prevent the state from seeking the death
penalty and was denied. The Superior Court and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the denial.  At the sec-
ond trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
In a 5-4 decision, delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that there was no double jeopardy bar to Pennsylvania’s seek-
ing the death penalty on retrial.  Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment “no person shall . . . be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
Along with reliance on other cases, the Court cited to Stroud v.
United States,8 where it recognized, as here, “[When a] defen-
dant is convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprison-
7. 123 S. Ct. 732 (2003).
8. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
9. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
10. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
11. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
ment, but appeals the con-
viction and succeeds in hav-
ing it set aside . . . jeopardy
has not terminated, so the
life sentence imposed in
connection with the initial
conviction raises no double
jeopardy bar to a death sen-
tence on retrial.”  The Court
rejected defendant’s con-
tention that due to the
unique treatment afforded
capital-sentencing proceed-
ings under Bullington v.
Missouri,9 double-jeopardy
protections were raised
when the jury deadlocked at
his first sentencing proceedings and the court prescribed a sen-
tence of life imprisonment pursuant to Pennsylvania law.  The
Court maintained that the automatic life sentence pursuant to
Pennsylvania law is not an acquittal, and the Court noted that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no statutory intent to
the contrary.  Finally, the Court also rejected defendant’s claim
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, finding nothing
indicated that any “life” or “liberty” interest that Pennsylvania
law gave defendant after the first trial was “somehow
immutable.”  
SIXTH AMENDMENT: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL
In Wiggins v. Smith,10 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion
for the 7-2 Court.  In this case, the Court determined that the
test for ineffective assistance of counsel, under Strickland v.
Washington,11 requires trial counsel to fully investigate a
defendant’s life history when trial counsel has reason to believe
those facts might lead to mitigation in a death penalty action.
During the sentencing phase of a trial, petitioner’s trial counsel
indicated to the jury that they would hear evidence in mitiga-
tion that petitioner “has had a difficult life.”  However, no evi-
dence was presented during the proceedings.  Trial counsel
had some knowledge of petitioner’s background, but not the
full picture.  Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, challeng-
ing “the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, arguing
that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assis-
tance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence
of his dysfunctional background.”  
The Court first recognized that its consideration of
Wiggins’s claim was controlled by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, which limits
their analysis “to the law as it was ‘clearly established’ by our
precedents at the time of the state court’s decisions.”  In
Strickland v. Washington,12 the Court established the legal rules
governing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The peti-
tioner must show: (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient;”
“[T]he Constitution
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and (2) “the deficiency prej-
udiced the defense.”
Although the Court has not
specified guidelines for
deficient performance, it
has stated that to show defi-
cient performance “a peti-
tioner must demonstrate
that counsel’s representa-
tion ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonable-
ness.’”  In this case, trial
counsel “attempt to justify
their limited investigation
as reflecting a tactical judg-
ment not to present mitigat-
ing evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternate strategy
instead.”  The Court concluded, however, that the trial coun-
sel’s failure to investigate more fully into petitioner’s back-
ground “fell short of the professional standards that prevailed
in Maryland in 1989.”  
EIGHTH AMENDMENT: SENTENCING AND THREE-
STRIKES LEGISLATION
In Ewing v. California,13 a 5-4 decision, the Court deter-
mined that a prison sentence of 25 years to life, imposed for
the offense of felony grand theft under the three-strikes law,
was not grossly disproportionate and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Under California law, grand theft is considered a “wobbler,”
meaning it is presumptively a felony, but at the discretion of
the trial court, may be reduced to a misdemeanor.  In this case,
although the defendant asked the court to reduce the convic-
tion for grand theft to a misdemeanor so as to avoid a three-
strikes sentence, or alternatively to exercise its discretion to
dismiss the allegations of some or all of his prior serious or vio-
lent felony convictions, the trial court refused and defendant
was sentenced to 25 years to life under California’s three-
strikes legislation.  
The Court, in upholding the sentence, first considered the
reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin
v. Michigan:14 “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel
and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’”  The Court
also looked to Rummel v. Estelle,15 where it “held that it did not
violate the Eighth Amendment for a State to sentence a three-
time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole.”
The Court cited Rummel for the proposition that “‘federal courts
should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of
imprisonment, and that successful challenges to the propor-
tionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.’” 
Turning to its seemingly contrary decision in Solem v.
Helm,16 in which the Court held unconstitutional the sentence
of life without the possibility of parole for the seventh in a
string of nonviolent offenses, the Court noted that in applying
the three factors relevant to the determination of whether a
sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Solem Court struck down the sentence, but
specifically noted the contrast between that sentence and the
sentence in Rummel, where the defendant was eligible for
parole.  Furthermore, the Solem Court specifically declined to
overrule Rummel.  Considering three-strikes legislation on a
more general note, the Court concluded, “We do not sit as a
‘superlegislature’ to second-guess these policy choices.  It is
enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual
felons ‘advances the goals of [its] criminal justice system in
any substantial way.’”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT
In Lockyer v. Andrade,17 a 5-4 Court in an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, held that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling
that the lower court’s affirmation of respondent’s sentence for
two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for two counts of theft
totaling less than $200 in videotapes was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent under
section 2254(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996.  California’s three-strikes law mandates
that any felony can constitute the third strike and can subject a
defendant to a term of 25 years to life in prison.  Respondent
received such a sentence.  Reviewing respondent’s habeas cor-
pus petition, the Ninth Circuit, looking to Rummel v. Estelle,18
Solem v. Helm,19 and Harmelin v. Michigan,20 concluded that
both Rummel and Solem remained “good law” and were
“instructive in Harmelin’s application.”  It stated that because
the California Court of Appeals compared the facts of Andrade’s
case to the facts of Rummel, but not Solem, the state court unrea-
sonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.  In
addressing the threshold matter of what constitutes clearly
established federal law, the Court noted that, according to
Williams v. Taylor,21 it can only be the holdings and not the dicta
of Supreme Court decisions at the time of a state court’s ruling.
The Court conceded that this case was difficult because
Supreme Court holdings on this issue had not been “a model of
clarity.”  The Court stated, “Through this thicket of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle
emerges as ‘clearly’ established under § 2254(d)(1):  A gross
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms
of years.”  However, the Court concluded, “The only relevant
clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unrea-
sonable application of’ framework is the gross disproportional-
ity principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applic-
able only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.”
13. 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
14. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
15. 445 U.S. 263 (1983).
16. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
17. 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003).
18. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
19. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
20. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
21. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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The final question for the Court was whether the California
Court of Appeals decision affirming Andrade’s sentence was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” this
disproportionality principle.  Here, the Court made two points.
First, the Court concluded that because Harmelin and Solem
specifically stated that they did not overrule Rummel, it was not
contrary to the Court’s clearly established law for the
California Court of Appeals to turn to Rummel in deciding
whether a sentence was grossly disproportionate.  Further,
Harmelin allows a state court to reasonably rely on Rummel in
determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate.
Therefore, the Court concluded, the California Court of
Appeals decision was not “contrary to” the governing legal
principles set forth in these cases.  
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 Court in
Stogner v. California.22 Here, the Court held that the California
statute resurrecting an otherwise time-barred criminal prose-
cution, which was enacted after the pre-existing statute of lim-
itation had run, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
States Constitution.  The California statute at issue permits
“prosecution for those crimes where ‘the limitations period
specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has expired’ – pro-
vided that (1) a victim has reported an allegation of abuse to
the police, (2) ‘there is independent evidence that clearly and
convincingly corroborates the victim’s allegation,’ and (3) the
prosecution is begun within one year of the victim’s report.”  A
related provision provides “that a prosecution satisfying these
three conditions ‘shall revive any cause of action barred by
[prior statute of limitations].’” 
The Constitution has two Ex Post Facto Clauses, Article I,
section 9, clause 3, which applies to the federal government,
and Article I, section 10, clause 1, which applies to states.  Both
prohibit the governments from “enacting laws with certain
retroactive effects.”  The Court recognized three effects of the
California statute: (1) it creates a “new criminal limitations
period that extends the time in which prosecution is allowed;”
(2) it authorizes “criminal prosecutions that the passage of
time had previously barred;” and (3) it was enacted after the
statute of limitations had run for the crime for which peti-
tioner was prosecuted.  The Court concluded that these three
effects rendered the statute invalid under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.  First, the Court concluded that the statute “threatens
the kind of harm that . . . the Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to
avoid:” “the Clause protects liberty by preventing governments
from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’
retroactive effects.”  Second, the Court determined that “the
kind of statute at issue falls literally within the categorical
description of ex post facto laws set forth by Justice Chase more
than 200 years before in Calder v. Bul.23 The Court stated: “[A]
statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after
a certain time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict
. . . . Consequently, to resurrect a prosecution after the relevant
statute of limitations has expired is to eliminate a currently
existing conclusive presumption
forbidding prosecution, and
thereby to permit prosecution
on a quantum of evidence where
that quantum, at the time the
new law is enacted, would have
been legally insufficient.”
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE: ALASKA SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION ACT
In Smith v. Doe,24 a 6-3 Court held that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act of 1994 is nonpunitive and its
retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.  On May 12, 1994, Alaska enacted the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act.  This law contains two components,
which are both retroactive.  The Act requires any “sex offender
or child kidnapper who is physically present in the state” to
register, either with the Department of Corrections, if the indi-
vidual is incarcerated, or with the local law enforcement
authorities if the individual is at liberty.  He must provide
name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of employ-
ment, date of birth, conviction information, information about
personal transportation, post-conviction treatment history, and
other such information.  The second component is the public
release of this information.  Respondents brought actions
under Rev. Stat. section 1979, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, seeking
to declare the Act void under the Ex Post Facto Clause of
Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the Constitution and the Due
Process Clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court began its analysis by noting that this was the first
time that it has considered a sex offender registration law
against Ex Post Facto Clause protection, but that the frame-
work for the Court’s inquiry is well established: first, the Court
must determine “whether the legislature meant the statute to
establish ‘civil’ proceedings;’” second, “if the intention of the
legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.
. . . However, [if] the intention was to enact a regulatory
scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine
whether the statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’
. . .”  Furthermore, because the Court ordinarily defers to the
legislature’s stated intent, “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice
to override legislative intent and transform what has been
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”
Reviewing legislative history, the Court concluded that
“nothing on the face of the statute suggests that the legislature
sought to create anything other than a civil . . . scheme
designed to protect the public from harm.”  Next, the Court
considered whether the Act imposes an “affirmative disability
or restraint” and concluded that it did not.  The Court rea-
soned that the Act imposes no physical restraint, which is the
affirmative example.  Further, “[t]he Act’s obligations are less
harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we
have held to be nonpunitive.”  In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
contention that the updating of the sex offender’s information
22. 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003).
23. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).  
24. 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
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Ex Post Facto
Clause.
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30. 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003).
poses a restriction and that
the Act resembles a proba-
tion scheme, the Court rea-
soned that the sex offender
does not have to update in
person, and that “offenders
subject to the Alaska
statute are free to move
where they wish and to live
and work as other citizens,
with no supervision.” The
Court also rejected Doe’s assertion that the length of the
reporting time was not proportional to the severity of the
offense and is retributive.  
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS: SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRY
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety, et al.  v. John Doe,25
a unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that Connecticut’s sex offender registry pro-
gram was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.  The Connecticut law requires all persons con-
victed of (a) a criminal offense against a minor, (b) violent or
nonviolent sexual offenses, or (c) felonies committed for a sex-
ual purpose, to register with the Connecticut Department of
Public Safety upon their release.  The registry requires names,
addresses, photographs, and DNA samples, as well as updated
photographs and notification of changes in address.  All registry
postings must include a warning that those who use the registry
improperly (as in to harass) will be subject to prosecution.
Reversing the lower courts, the Court determined that there
was no due process violation because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require an opportunity to prove a fact not
material to the statutory scheme, i.e., a hearing first to deter-
mine whether or not the class members are “particularly likely
to be currently dangerous before being labeled as such by their
inclusion in a publicly disseminated registry.”  Citing to Paul v.
Davis,26 the Court stated “that mere injury to reputation, even
if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty
interest.”    Furthermore, the Court distinguished both
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,27 and Goss v. Lopez,28 which cumu-
latively require the Government to provide hearings to prove or
disprove certain facts, stating, “[h]ere, however, the fact that
respondent seeks to prove—he is not currently dangerous—is
of no consequence. . . . [a]s the DPS Website explains, the law’s
requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone—a fact
that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safe-
guarded opportunity to contest.”
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT—RICO
In Pacificare Health Care Systems, Inc. v. Book,29 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion, and all other justices joined, except
for Justice Thomas, who took no part in the decision. Here, the
Court held that it would be premature for the it to address the
issue of  whether an arbitration agreement that contains a
punitive damages restriction is unenforceable with regards to a
parties’ claim for treble damages under RICO because it was
unclear whether the provision did and would actually be
applied to the RICO claims by the arbitrator. The arbitration
agreements in this action contained clauses limiting the award
of punitive damages.  Respondent opposed arbitration because
“the arbitration provisions prohibit an award of punitive dam-
ages,” and “respondents could not obtain ‘meaningful relief’ in
arbitration for their claims under the RICO statute, which
authorizes treble damages.”  The Court wrote that neither
“precedents” nor “the ambiguous terms of the contracts”
necessitate that these “provisions preclude an arbitrator from
awarding treble-damages under RICO.” The Court noted that
its prior cases “have placed different statutory treble-damages
provisions on different points along the spectrum between
purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.”  The Court
stated that if the contractual ambiguity, itself, were a “gateway”
question, then there would be no question about its ability to
decide the issue.  However, the ambiguity as to the language
and how the arbitrator will construe the remedial provisions,
and whether this will render the “agreements unenforceable,”
is “unusually abstract.”  Therefore, “the proper course is to
compel arbitration.”   
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: HOBBS ACT AND THE
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women,30 petitioners
presented an argument alleging that respondents “were mem-
bers of a nationwide conspiracy to ‘shut down’ abortion clinics
through a pattern of racketeering activity that included actions
of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.”  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held the Hobbs Act and RICO
may not be applied to anti-abortion activist organizations or
individuals because such groups or individuals do not “obtain”
property in a manner necessary for a predicate act of extortion.
The Court began its analysis with the assertion that it “need not
now trace what are the outer boundaries of extortion liability
under the Hobbs Act, so that liability might be based on obtain-
ing something as intangible as another’s right to exercise exclu-
sive control over the use of a party’s assets . . . [for] [w]hatever
the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize peti-
tioners’ actions here as an ‘obtaining of property from’ respon-
dents is well beyond them.”  The Court performed an analysis
of the statutory language.  Beginning with the common-law def-
inition of extortion according to William Blackstone, the Court
then noted that the Hobbs Act retained the requirement that
statutory language that property must be “obtained.”  Further,
“[e]liminating the requirement that property must be obtained
to constitute extortion would not only conflict with the express
20 Court Review - Summer 2003
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31. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
32. 435 U.S. 371 (1978).
33. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
34. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
35. 123 S. Ct. 819 (2003).
36. 127 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 1997).
37. 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
requirement of the Hobbs Act, it would also eliminate the rec-
ognized distinction between extortion and the separate crime of
coercion.”  
With this judicial history, the Court noted that it was sig-
nificant that Congress deliberately omitted coercion in the
drafting of the Hobbs Act. The Court also recognized its own
decision in United States v. Teamsters,31 in which the Court cre-
ated an exception in the Anti-Racketeering Act that Congress
decided to replace with the Hobbs Act, but still omitted coer-
cion.  The Court then resolved an apparent contradiction in its
own history.  Under United States v. Culbert,32 the Court stated
“that the words of the Hobbs Act ‘do not lend themselves to
restrictive interpretation,’” and under United States v. Enmons,33
in which the Court stated that since the Hobbs Act was a crim-
inal statute ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity.  To
this the Court asserts that, under McNally v. United States,34
when there are two possible interpretations of a criminal
statute, only with definite language from Congress can a court
choose the harsher interpretation.  Hence, “[i]f the distinction
between extortion and coercion, which we find controls these
cases, is to be abandoned, such a significant expansion of the
law’s coverage must come from Congress, and not from the
courts.” Addressing the issue of state extortion charges, the
Court reasons that “[b]ecause petitioners did not obtain or
attempt to obtain respondents’ property, both the state extor-
tion claims and the claim of attempting or conspiring to com-
mit state extortion were fatally flawed.”  Because all of the
predicate acts supporting the jury’s finding of a RICO violation
must be reversed, the judgment that the petitions violated
RICO must also be reversed.  
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: NINTH CIRCUIT’S
“AUTOMATIC TERMINATION” OF A CONSPIRACY
In United States v. Jimenez Recio,35 the Court held the Ninth
Circuit was incorrect in its view that a conspiracy ends through
“defeat” when the Government intervenes and makes the con-
spiracy’s goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators
do not know that the Government has intervened.  On
November 18, 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada.  They
found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs, and with the
help of the truck’s two drivers they set up a sting.  The
Government took the truck and the drivers to the truck’s orig-
inal destination, where the drivers engaged a contact who said
he would send someone to get the truck.  Three hours later, the
two defendants arrived at the truck’s location and drove the
truck away from the location.  Police arrested the two men.
The Ninth Circuit agreed by a panel vote of 2 to 1 that United
States v. Cruz36 was binding law.  In Cruz, the Ninth Circuit
wrote that a conspiracy terminates when “there is affirmative
evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of
the object of the conspiracy.”  The Ninth Circuit reached this
conclusion after considering the conviction of an individual
who had joined a conspiracy to distribute drugs after the
Government had seized the
drugs.  The Circuit court found
that the Government’s seizure of
the drugs guaranteed the
“defeat” of the conspiracy’s
object, so the individual who
had joined after that point could
not be convicted of conspiracy.  
The Court began its analysis
by stating of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that a conspiracy con-
tinues “until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment,
withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspir-
acy,” with the “defeat of the object” being the critical portion.
The Ninth Circuit clearly intended that the government ends a
conspiracy by stopping it even for conspirators who are totally
unaware that the government has made the object of the con-
spiracy impossible to achieve.  The Court stated that, in its
view, this is incorrect. First, the Court said the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusions were inconsistent with the “proper view of the
law.”  The Court has repeatedly stated that the essence of con-
spiracy is “an agreement to commit an unlawful act.”
Furthermore, a conspiracy agreement is “a distinct evil,” which
“may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive
crime ensues.”  Last, a “conspiracy poses a ‘threat to the pub-
lic’ over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant
substantive crime—both because the ‘combination in crime
makes more likely the commission of [other] crimes’ and
because it ‘decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality.’”  The Court
stated “[t]hat being so, the Government’s defeat of the con-
spiracy’s objective will not necessarily and automatically ter-
minate the conspiracy.”  The Court noted that almost all
“courts and commentators” endorse the view of the Court in
its holding in this case.  
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: ANTITERRORISM AND
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT AND CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
In Miller-El v. Cockrell,37 the Court determined that, under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act when a court
of appeals is considering issuing a certificate of appealability to
a habeas applicant, the court of appeals should limit its exami-
nation to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his
claims, and the prisoner seeking the certificate of appealability
need only demonstrate “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”38 The Court took note of the require-
ments for the granting of a certificate of appealability, which is
necessary for a federal court of appeals to have jurisdiction to
rule on the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners:  such a
certificate can be issued only if the requirements of section
2253 have been met.  Under section 2253(c), a petitioner must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
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right.”  As it did in Barefoot v.
Estelle,39 the Court deter-
mined that for a requisite
showing, the petitioner must
“show that reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been
resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented
were ‘adequate to deserve
encouragement.’”  The Court
noted that “[t]his threshold
inquiry does not require full
consideration of the factual or
legal bases adduced in sup-
port of the claims.”
Furthermore, the Court
declared  that “[w]hen a court
of appeals side steps this process by first deciding the merits of
an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a [certificate of
appealability] based on its adjudication of the actual merits, it
is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: 28 U.S.C. SECTION 2254(D)
In Price v. Vincent,40 a unanimous Court held a habeas peti-
tioner whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court
was not entitled to relief in a federal court unless he meets the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  Respondent filed a
habeas petition under section 2254(d), which included a dou-
ble jeopardy claim that rested on the same facts presented in his
state court appeal.  The Court concluded, therefore, he was not
entitled to review unless he could demonstrate the state court’s
adjudication of his claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  A state
court’s decision is only “‘contrary to’ our clearly established law
if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth
in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of the Court and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from our precedent.’”  Additionally,
the state court’s decision is only “an unreasonable application of
clearly established law” if “the state court applied [that case] to
the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”  In
this case, the Court said neither had occurred.    
HABEAS CORPUS: INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-
COUNSEL CLAIMS
In Massaro v. United States,41 Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court. Here, the Court held that an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a
collateral proceeding under section 2255, regardless of
whether the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct
appeal. The Court began its analysis by noting that under
United States v. Frady42 and Bousley v. United States,43 “claims
not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral
review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.”
However, the “procedural default rule is neither a statutory nor
a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by
the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the
law’s important interests in the finality of judgments.”  The
Court reasoned that by requiring ineffectiveness-of-counsel
claims be lodged on direct appeal, it would be forcing the
claimant to raise the issue before there has been an opportu-
nity to fully develop the factual predicate, and it would be a
forum not best suited to asses the facts: “When an ineffective-
assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel
and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed
precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and
thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”  
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL
Addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in
Woodford v. Visciotti,44 the Court found that the California
Supreme Court did not err in its application of Strickland v.
Washington,45 and also correctly applied the “unreasonable
application clause” of 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  The
California Supreme Court did not dispute that respondent’s
counsel was constitutionally inadequate during the sentenc-
ing phase, but concluded that it did not prejudice the jury’s
sentencing decision.  In Strickland, the Court held that to
prove prejudice the defendant must establish a “reasonable
probability” that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  It also
specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to
prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have
been altered.  
In determining that the California Supreme Court erred in
its application of Strickland, the Ninth Circuit read the
California court’s opinion as applying the latter test—requiring
respondent to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different.
The Court noted that the state supreme court “painstakingly”
cited and applied Strickland, but that the Ninth Circuit fixed
on three occasions where the state court shortened the phrase
“reasonably probable” to “probable” without the modifier.  The
Court concluded, “Its occasional shorthand reference to that
standard by use of the term ‘probable’ without the modifier
may perhaps be imprecise, but if so, it can no more be consid-
ered a repudiation of the standard than can this Court’s own
occasional indulgence in the same imprecision.”  The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that the state court’s determination that
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respondent suffered no prejudice was “objectively unreason-
able.”  To this assertion, the Court responded that in its opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit ruled contrary to the standard set out in
28 U.S.C. section 2254(d).  The Court concluded that the
Ninth Circuit substituted its own judgment for the state court’s
judgment by ignoring the crucial distinction between “an
unreasonable application of federal law” from an “incorrect
application of federal law.”    
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: SECTION 2254(A)
In Early v. Packer,46 a per curiam decision, the Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit granting a petition
for a writ habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(a), as
incorrect on the grounds that the court of appeals wrongly con-
cluded that the state court’s decision contradicted federal law.
The petitioner filed for a writ after conviction in state court,
alleging the trial judge improperly instructed the jury by urg-
ing the jury to assess the facts and apply them to the law as he
stated it and asking for a count of the jury, which resulted in an
11 to 1 tally.  The Court first concluded that, contrary to the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, it was not necessary for a state court to
cite to federal precedent in its decision.  Second, it also con-
cluded that the state court did not improperly apply the total-
ity of circumstances test set forth in Lowenfield v. Phelps.47
Finally, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit improperly
relied on Jenkins v. United States48 and United States v. United
States Gypsum Co.,49 which the Ninth Circuit interpreted to
protect a defendant from the trial court urging jurors to reach
any verdict, not just protecting him from a trial court urging a
particular type of verdict.  The Court responded that “[n]either
Jenkins nor Gypsum Co. is relevant to the § 2254(d)(1) deter-
mination, since neither case sets forth a rule applying to state-
court proceedings.”  The Court found that both cases reversed
convictions based on jury instructions given in federal prose-
cutions, and that “neither opinion purported to interpret any
provision of the Constitution. . . . [so that] the Ninth Circuit
erred by relying on those nonconstitutional decisions.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Seeking to secure uniformity among the circuit courts, a
unanimous Court, in Clay v. United States,50 held that for the
purpose of 28 U.S.C. section 2255’s one-year limitation period,
a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires
for filing a petition for certiorari.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the Court, said, “Because ‘we presume that Congress expects
its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court’s prece-
dents,’51 our unvarying understanding of finality for collateral
review purposes would ordinarily determine the meaning of
‘becomes final’ in § 2255.”  According to precedent, “Finality
attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on
direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or
when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires. . . .”
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